Who pays for cooperation in global health? A comparative analysis of WHO, the World Bank, the Global Fund to Fight HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, and Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance by Clinton, Chelsea & Sridhar, Devi
  
 
 
 
Edinburgh Research Explorer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Who pays for cooperation in global health? A comparative
analysis of WHO, the World Bank, the Global Fund to Fight
HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, and Gavi, the Vaccine
Alliance
Citation for published version:
Clinton, C & Sridhar, D 2017, 'Who pays for cooperation in global health? A comparative analysis of WHO,
the World Bank, the Global Fund to Fight HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, and Gavi, the Vaccine
Alliance' The Lancet, vol. 390, no. 10091, pp. 324-332. DOI: 10.1016/S0140-6736(16)32402-3
Digital Object Identifier (DOI):
10.1016/S0140-6736(16)32402-3
Link:
Link to publication record in Edinburgh Research Explorer
Document Version:
Peer reviewed version
Published In:
The Lancet
Publisher Rights Statement:
This is the author's peer reviewed manuscript as accepted for publication.
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s)
and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and
abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer
content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please
contact openaccess@ed.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and
investigate your claim.
Download date: 05. Apr. 2019
Accepted for publication in the Lancet. Not for Circulation or Distribution.  
	   1	  
Title: Who Pays for Cooperation in Global Health? A Comparative Analysis of 
the World Health Organization, the World Bank, the Global Fund to Fight 
HIV/AIDS, TB and Malaria and the Gavi Alliance 
 
Authors1:  
 
Chelsea Clinton, Mailman School of Public Health, Columbia University, D.Phil  
 
Devi Sridhar, Edinburgh Medical School, Edinburgh University, D.Phil, 
devi.sridhar@ed.ac.uk, +44 131 650 6194 
 
 
Abstract: 
 
In this article we examine who pays for cooperation in global health through 
analyzing the financial flows of the World Health Organization (WHO), the World 
Bank, the Global Fund to Fight HIV/AIDS, TB and Malaria, and Gavi, the Vaccine 
Alliance. We find that the past few decades have seen the consolidation of influence 
in the disproportionate roles the U.S., U.K., and the Bill and Melinda Gates 
Foundation have played. Current financing flows in all four case study institutions 
allow donors to finance and deliver assistance in ways that they can more closely 
control and monitor at every stage. We highlight three major trends in global health 
governance more broadly that relate to this development: towards more discretionary 
funding and away from core or longer-term funding; towards defined multi-
stakeholder governance and away from traditional government-centered 
representation and decision-making; towards narrower mandates or problem-focused 
“vertical” initiatives and away from broader systemic goals. 
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Key Messages: 
 
1. Three major trends in global health governance over the past two decades are: 
towards more discretionary funding and away from core or longer-term 
funding; towards multi-stakeholder governance and away from traditional 
government-centered representation and decision-making; towards narrower 
mandates or problem-focused “vertical” initiatives and away from broader 
systemic goals sought through multilateral cooperation. 
2. The shifts described above are reflected in the creation of partnerships such as 
the Global Fund to Fight HIV/AIDS, TB and Malaria and Gavi, the Vaccine 
Alliance as well as in the increased voluntary contributions to the World 
Health Organization and World Bank. These mechanisms allow donors to 
                                                
1 Joint first authors 	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finance and deliver assistance in ways that they can more closely control and 
monitor at every stage. 
3. WHO’s volatile financial state is a reflection of a lack of donors’ trust in the 
agency. Reform should focus on improving the agency’s relationship to 
monitoring and accountability through addressing membership, including 
voting rights for non-state actors, and transparency to the public and member 
states. 
4. The past few decades have seen the consolidation of influence across all four 
of our case study institutions in the roles the United States, the United 
Kingdom, and the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation have all played. Despite a 
proliferation of initiatives in global health, much of the financing comes from 
a few powerful donors. 
 
Introduction:  
 
Whether it is confronting and containing an Ebola outbreak originating in 
Guinea or a Zika outbreak originating in Brazil, deploying vaccines to rural India, or 
getting insecticide-treated bed nets to Malawi, governance matters. It is through 
institutions that nations have long organized and focused efforts to protect and 
improve the health of their citizens. Today, however, health governance has gone 
global. Global governance is formally conducted by and across national governments 
and non-state actors through international institutions, underpinned by both financing 
to enable them to fulfill their missions and rules to structure interaction. 
 
The essential functions of health governance, which historically have been the 
purview of the World Health Organization (WHO) and its governing board, and now 
are stretched across a broader spectrum of actors, include: convening key 
stakeholders; defining shared values; establishing standards and regulatory 
frameworks; setting priorities; mobilizing and aligning resources; disease 
surveillance and health emergency and outbreak response; and promoting research 
and development (1). All of these are vital to mounting responses to prevent and treat 
infectious diseases and non-communicable diseases (NCDs) alike. 
 
 To understand institutions means delving into how they are governed, how 
they make decisions, and how they are financed. In this article, we take a closer look 
at the World Health Organization, the chief coordinator and director of international 
health within the United Nations, and compare its financing and governance with 
three of the most important global institutions, as determined by resources 
commanded and disbursed (Figure 1): the World Bank, the Global Fund to Fight 
AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, and Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance.  
 
We focus on three research questions in this article: How are the WHO, World 
Bank, the Global Fund, and Gavi financed? How does their financing possibly 
influence their agenda and third, what explains the financing flows and new 
governance of global health? To answer the first, we rely on data from each institution 
itself as well as data aggregated by the Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation at 
the University of Washington (IHME). For the second, we look for evidence as to 
how changes in financing flows have influenced the institutions’ agenda over time. 
Finally, we offer our own thoughts and reflections about what explains these various 
shifts and what this means for the future of the WHO. 
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Financing the WHO 
 
The WHO was established, as it states in its own words, ‘to direct and 
coordinate’ international public health efforts and is primarily a normative and 
technical agency (2). WHO receives funding from two tranches: assessed 
contributions from its 194 member states (previously called ‘regular budget funds’) 
and voluntary contributions (previously called ‘extrabudgetary funds’) from its 
member states, philanthropic foundations, corporations, non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs), and private individuals (3). The former are the monies WHO 
has full discretion to use as its leadership determines and the World Health Assembly 
(WHA), a body comprised of all its member states, approves. In practice, core funds 
are used to support the administrative costs of running WHO and programs that may 
not have received funding through other channels. Individual states’ membership dues 
are calculated in conjunction with WHO’s biennial budget process and based on the 
UN’s standard scale of ability to pay as determined by a country’s gross national 
product (size of economy) and population. 
In 1980, the WHA voted to freeze its membership assessments in real dollar 
terms; in other words, only inflation and exchange rates would influence membership 
assessment adjustments (4,5). This took effect with the 1982-1983 budget. 
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the failure of member states to pay even their frozen 
levels of contributions presented a significant challenge for WHO. The United States 
in particular withheld funds, a move largely interpreted as expressing dissatisfaction 
with WHO’s list of essential medicines (6), in line with public opposition from U.S. 
pharmaceutical companies (4, 7). In 2014, the collection rate was 86% (8, 9). The 
WHO has little leeway to force states to pay even their membership dues; loss of 
voting rights is the most extreme step it can take, but rarely does until a state is in 
significant arrears (10). 
A larger challenge for WHO has been the steady rise of extrabugetary funding 
as a percentage of the WHO overall budget, steadily approaching 80% (Figure 2- 
webappendix). Over time, the rearrangement of WHO’s priorities to align with funds 
was inevitable with donors earmarking 93% of voluntary funds in the 2014-15 budget 
(11-13). Influence is heavily concentrated among the top donors (Figure 3) (13). 
Undeniably then, a direct link exists between financial contributions and WHO focus.  
 
Financing the World Bank 
Alongside using voluntary contributions as a mechanism of control over WHO 
activities, donors also turned to other institutions, first the World Bank and then later 
Gavi and the Global Fund, to further exert influence in global health and over their 
use of funds. Over the past 40 years, the World Bank has become increasingly 
important in health through its lending for health-related projects, and its role as an 
advisory body, an intellectual research institute and a training centre for developing 
country civil servants (14). The Bank’s legacy in health is controversial given its 
former support of structural adjustment and user fees, which the current Bank 
President Jim Kim has recanted (15). Yet, within the Bank, health itself claims a 
relatively small share of attention. For its 2014 fiscal year, loans in the ‘health and 
other social services’ space stood at less than $3.4 billion, out of a total loan pool of 
more than $40.8 billion (16,17). Health loans accounted for less than 10% of the 
Bank’s portfolio that year, barely edging above 8% of total loan volume.  
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From 1990 through 2011, the World Bank, according to its own data, 
disbursed close to $20 billion in grants and loans throughout its health, nutrition, and 
population (HNP) portfolio, and $33.8 billion over the same time period in loans and 
grants, plus $2.8 billion of in-kind support, when a broader definition of health (e.g. 
inclusive of HIV/AIDS) is used (16, 17).  
The World Bank generally refers to the International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development (IBRD) and the International Development Association (IDA), the 
two largest parts of the Bank. The IBRD is funded by capital contributions from its 
members and is effectively ‘owned’ by its 188 member states. As votes are allocated 
based on capital subscription, there is clearly an incentive for member states to meet – 
and even seek to increase – their capital commitments. This pressure is evident in the 
recent intransigence of the United States Congress to cede a portion of its current 
16.1% voting share (which allows it to effectively block any decision it does not agree 
with given most of the Bank’s key decisions require 85% of all votes outstanding to 
approve) and in China’s efforts to invest more into the Bank to gain a commensurate 
rise in voting power. However, the majority of IBRD’s funding comes from the 
issuance of World Bank bonds that are sold into capital markets across the world. Yet, 
given the broad market for such bonds, it is the capital contributors, not the 
bondholders, who exert more influence over the Bank’s agenda.  
In contrast, IDA is funded by replenishments, or donor commitments made at 
specific intervals, generally every three years. Since its launch in 1960, IDA has 
convened 17 replenishment meetings, securing increasing IDA commitments from 
World Bank members almost every round. Only Bank members can contribute to IDA 
– there is no mechanism for the Gates Foundation for example, to contribute to IDA 
although Gates and others have invested alongside IDA in health related areas, for 
example in polio eradication (18). IDA’s first replenishment raised $750 million, with 
the U.S. accounting for more than 40% of total funds pledged. In 1984, in advance of 
IDA’s 17th replenishment, the U.S. said it would not account for more than 25% of 
IDA at any point in time, in line with similar arguments expressed throughout the UN 
system, including at WHO (19). While the World Bank convenes the replenishments, 
in practice, they are overseen by donors, not the Bank nor IDA recipients. Looking at 
the 16th replenishment provides a more complete picture of IDA donors (Figure 4). It 
is clear a finite number of donors account for the majority of IDA’s coffers, and it is a 
similar list to those most prominent to WHO’s budget. 
Yet, unlike is true for WHO, it is hard to see evidence of greater donor control 
in the patterns of IBRD and IDA funding – or in how the Bank then chose to allocate 
those funds. In fact, it is only through trust funds that donors can earmark funding for 
specific uses; in 2012, roughly $5 billion, or more than one-third of donor 
contributions were earmarked (20). Trust funds are a financial arrangement set up 
with contributions from one or more donors and in some cases from the World Bank 
Group itself for a particular purpose. A trust fund can be country-specific, regional, or 
global in its geographic scope, and it can be free-standing or programmatic. 
 
Financing The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria 
A core difference between the ‘old’ institutions, WHO and the World Bank, 
and the ‘new’ ones, the Global Fund and Gavi, is the latters’ focused mandates. The 
Global Fund is a financing mechanism targeting efforts to end HIV/AIDS, 
tuberculosis and malaria while Gavi also marshals funds toward a goal of equitable 
access to vaccines for children living in the world’s poorest countries. Unlike WHO 
or the Bank, the Global Fund relies entirely on voluntary contributions. Even for its 
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de facto permanent Board members, like the U.S., China, and the Gates Foundation, 
there is no formalized expectation of funds contributed annually. Similar to IDA, the 
Global Fund relies on replenishment as its principal fundraising mechanism. At 
replenishment time the donors alone take center stage. Aside from the Gates 
Foundation, the composition of the Fund’s major donors closely resembles IDA’s 
major donors (Figure 5). 
 In its first 13 years, the Fund received $29.6 billion in financial contributions, 
with $27.9 billion coming from donor countries, including both Board Members and 
non-members, and from a small number of implementing countries largely through 
debt swap arrangements with donor governments. These were not common 
arrangements, accounting for less than .3% of total funds over the period (21). When 
swap agreements were struck, donor governments would forgive part of a loan 
repayment if developing countries would invest a commensurate amount in Global 
Fund grant arrangements in their countries. Through the end of 2013, the Fund had 
received $75.8 million from five swap agreements across four implementing countries 
and two donors. For purposes of our analyses, we include those debt swap 
arrangements as donor contributions under the relevant donor. As was true for many 
public health concerns in the early 21st century, the only significant non-bilateral 
donor to the Fund was the Gates Foundation. The Gates Foundation donated more 
than $1.1 billion to the Fund in its first 13 years, accounting for two-thirds of all non-
bilateral funds the Global Fund received over that time period (21). 
From 2000-2013, bilateral donors accounted for 94.3% of the monies the 
Global Fund raised (21). Unlike the World Bank’s IBRD or Gavi, the Global Fund 
Board never seriously considered and certainly never approved raising funds through 
the capital markets (22). Neither did the Global Fund Board ever decide, despite 
significant debates inside the Board and outside the Fund, to introduce expected 
contributions levels from donor countries (23). In addition, the Board's inability for 
much of its first decade to determine protocols for accepting in-kind donations due to 
generic market concerns may also explain why private support never materialized at 
substantial levels (24). Yet even for WHO, which has long-standing protocols 
governing in-kind donations, such donations have never proven meaningful as a 
percentage of budget.  
Regardless, the Global Fund funding base is similar to the WHO and the 
World Bank’s IDA. The United States in particular has strong presence on the Global 
Fund Board, and in its coffers. Most years, the U.S. has accounted for one-third of the 
Fund’s total received contributions. The U.S. is not a passive nor quiet investor. For 
years now, following every Global Fund Board meeting, the U.S. publishes its points 
of view on Board decisions and debates. Analyzing every such document through the 
first 28 Board meetings, against the Board decision points, yields few disagreements 
and no significant ones between the decisions of the Global Fund Board and the 
organization’s largest funder (25). The U.S. also maintains a staff presence in Geneva 
to liaise with the Global Fund. The greater density of interactions that likely result 
from such an arrangement may help explain the congruence between the Fund and the 
U.S., a dynamic amplified by the more frequent meetings that Global Fund donors 
have often held between Board meetings than have implementing countries (the 
Fund’s terminology for recipient countries) or civil society organizations involved 
with the Fund, including those that serve on its Board (26). Or, the explanation may 
lie in the dependence of the Fund on U.S. funds. Looking solely through a financing 
lens, it is clear that donors, and notably the Fund’s largest donor the United States, 
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work hard to ensure their voices are coordinated when possible and heard well beyond 
the Board room.  
 
Financing Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance 
Gavi, and particularly the Global Fund, benefitted from the robust 
development assistance for health environment coincident with their first years (what 
IHME termed ‘the Golden Age’) (27). Although Gavi raised much smaller amounts 
than the Global Fund, its experience of how it raised those funds contrasts sharply– 
even if the source of those funds does not differ. Unlike the Fund and World 
Bank/IDA, Gavi came relatively late to replenishment as a means to marshal donor 
funds. Prior to its first pledging conference in June 2011, all donor contributions to 
Gavi were made on an ad hoc basis.  
Through December 2013, Gavi received $8.3 billion in direct donor 
contributions (Figure 6). Its most significant source of funds, by far, was the Gates 
Foundation, which contributed $2.1 billion. Notably, the Gates Foundation’s 
contributions were effectively synonymous with non-bilateral support. Contributions 
from the Gates Foundation, both through direct unconditional funds and through 
matching funds, comprised 97% of non-governmental and non-intergovernmental 
(e.g., the OPEC Fund and the European Union) support (28). Yet the Gates 
Foundation’s support, and by extension non-bilateral support, became less important 
on a percentage basis in Gavi’s early second decade than had been true in its first ten 
years. 
Additionally, one of Gavi’s ‘innovative mechanisms’ accounted for an 
additional 15% of the monies raised in its first 13 years. Gavi received $1.24 billion 
from the International Financing Facility for Innovation mechanism (IFFIm), which 
effectively securitizes long-term pledges from bilateral donors, converting the pledges  
into usable cash resources by selling bonds in the capital markets. Through the end of 
2013, the United Kingdom, France, Sweden, Norway, the Netherlands, Spain, Italy, 
and South Africa had provided support to Gavi through the purchase of long-term 
IFFIm bonds. Collectively they had pledged $6 billion over 20 years that had 
translated into $4.5 billion of bonds sold (29). Also over the same time horizon, Gavi 
raised $581.8 million through the Advance Market Commitment (AMC), a 
mechanism through which donors committed to purchase new pneumococcal vaccines 
at a price that covers development costs and provides some profit for the drugs’ 
manufacturers with the provision that they only be distributed in low- and middle-
income countries (30, 31, 32). The donor composition for the AMC differs a bit from 
that of Gavi as a whole, with Italy accounting for more than 40% of total AMC-
related funds through early 2015 (33-38).  
Still, for all of its mobilization of funds through innovative mechanisms and 
the strong, even foundational support of the Gates Foundation, Gavi is largely 
dependent on a conventional bilateral donor list. Moreover, Gavi is even more 
dependent on the Gates Foundation than the Global Fund is. Gavi and the Fund are 
hardly alone in continuing to rely on bilateral donors. Even the International AIDS 
Vaccine Initiative and related HIV/AIDS-vaccine initiatives are largely funded by 
governments, despite the strong business case for the private sector investing in this 
work; 83% of aggregate funding for a HIV/AIDS vaccine in 2011 came from the 
public sector, 13% from the philanthropic/foundations sector, and only 4% from the 
private sector (39).   
It is harder to discern the likely influence at Gavi as neither the Gates 
Foundation nor the U.K. or U.S., the three largest donors to Gavi, publish their views 
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on Gavi Board decisions in the way the U.S. does following Global Fund Board 
meetings. This may be because of the strong influence they exert quietly or because 
Gavi hews to the vision its donors, principally the Gates Foundation, have for it. 
Additionally, Gavi has also long provided support to its developing country Board 
members to meet before Board meetings, investments the Global Fund started only to 
make relatively more recently. We are unable to discern whether such facilitation may 
have led to a greater harmonization of interests across diverse constituencies, or 
convergence to donor preferences. 
 
 
Why has so much investment been made in the new partnerships, and why are the 
four institutions financed in this way? 
 
The move towards the partnership model in global health and voluntary 
contributions to the WHO and World Bank allows donors to finance and deliver 
assistance in ways that they can more closely control and monitor at every stage. The 
shift towards partnerships like the Global Fund and Gavi illustrates three major trends 
in global health governance more broadly: towards more discretionary funding and 
away from core or longer-term funding; towards multi-stakeholder governance and 
away from traditional government-centered representation and decision-making; 
towards narrower mandates or problem-focused “vertical” initiatives and away from 
broader systemic goals sought through multilateral cooperation (40).   
 
By using financing and governance mechanisms within the ‘old’ institutions, 
as well as by creating new agencies, donors can more likely achieve their goals for a 
few reasons. First, they have structurally aligned the objectives of global agencies 
with their own objectives. Individual governments (or small groups of governments 
and like-minded others) can use new funding mechanisms, agencies, or initiatives as a 
way to define and pursue a separate mandate. HIV/AIDS, discussed in Box 1, is only 
one such example.  
 
Second, funders have created and enforced incentives for performance. As 
seen in the above, governments, as well as other donors, can (and do) use budget as 
rewards and punishments in their attempts to induce international institutions to 
achieve particular outcomes. This has taken two forms: an increase in discretionary 
contributions to conventional multilateral organizations (as seen at WHO) while not 
increasing core budget support, and the establishment of new organizations funded 
through a replenishment model (as seen with the Global Fund and Gavi). 
Additionally, from inception, the Global Fund has linked past grant performance to 
fundraising. Gavi also has long promised results as proof of concept to its donors. 
 
 Third, donors have more directly reduced the technical knowledge gap 
between themselves and the global health institutions they support. In WHO and the 
World Bank, it is the senior management of the organization who present proposals to 
the Board, thus ensuring that the management and staff of the organization retain 
considerable influence and agenda-setting power (even if they are unable secure the 
funds for this agenda). By contrast, the decision-making Boards of the Global Fund 
and Gavi instead take advice from panels composed of independent experts that make 
recommendations to them directly (at Gavi the Independent Review Committee 
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recommendations go first to the Chief Executive but then are passed along to the 
Board). 
 
Fourth, key donors can more closely monitor what global agencies are doing. 
As technology has enabled closer monitoring (at least in theory), this has become a 
major preoccupation of donors in recent years, placing emphasis on organizations’ 
demonstrating results through results based management systems, comprehensive 
results frameworks, an increased use of evaluations (both independent and in-house), 
and increasing transparency for donors and the public. When contrasted to the Global 
Fund and Gavi, the World Bank and WHO look particularly difficult to monitor: for 
starters, their activities are broader and more diffuse, their budgets are more complex 
and their regional and country offices make complete oversight impossible. In 
contrast, the Global Fund provides detailed financial information about its grant 
commitments and disbursements, donor pledges and contributions, and, importantly, 
grant progress reports. It also discloses the independent Technical Review Panel 
recommendations and then Board decisions. Additionally, most donors have people 
on the ground in countries receiving funds from the Global Fund who at times are 
members of the country coordinating mechanisms charged with overseeing grant 
implementation. This translates into more real-time monitoring for certain donors than 
even the Global Fund Secretariat could claim. Gavi has a Transparency and 
Accountability Policy that governs the management of all cash-based support to Gavi 
eligible countries and similarly discloses all Independent Review Committee 
recommendations and Board decisions related to Gavi applications and approved 
grants. Donors have pushed the World Bank in this direction. For example, in 1993 
the Board, driven by the U.S., created the Independent Inspection Panel: an institution 
investigating Bank decisions and actions and reporting directly to the Board (41, 42). 
This is similar to what the U.S. pushed for, and achieved, 15 years later with the 
introduction of the Inspector General at the Global Fund and what we, and others, 
have recommended, without successful adoption, for WHO (43).  
 
Influence of Financing Flows on Global Health 
 
The irony that our analysis brings to the fore is that states form and join global 
institutions such as WHO recognizing the need for collective action that does not 
always mesh with their own individual national interests. Yet, as the shifts in global 
governance over the past two decades demonstrate, they largely resist providing the 
adequate support and investment necessary for the institutions to succeed on 
delivering against collectively determined priorities.  
Three important risks emerge from varied, and unpredictable, financing flows 
(40). A first concern is normative. Critics allege that global health pursued through 
coalitions of the willing (either in vertical initiatives or in discretionary special funds 
in international organizations) impose the priorities of powerful donor states and 
philanthropic organizations on poorer countries, whose populations have little 
recourse to demand accountability or to influence these priorities given their inability 
to contribute funds or affect donor decision-making.  
A second concern is efficiency (40). The risk is that the new health funding may 
be creating mechanisms that encourage donors to favor short-term priorities, even 
important ones, over longer-term public health goals: the rationale for creating WHO 
was to ensure that nations would ‘compromise their short-term differences in order to 
attain the long-run advantages of regularized collaboration on health matters’ (44).  
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 A third consequence of the shifts in global health financing and governance is 
the consequent erosion of and underinvestment in important capacities in global 
public health. For example, the knowledge and information derived from global 
monitoring today to help plan for and prevent epidemics and other health crises in the 
future, historically the purview of WHO. The dissipation of donor support for WHO 
broadly, and in these areas specifically, led to the now well-documented collapse in 
funding for its pandemic preparedness and response functions (45). Global monitoring 
may be a casualty of the new health funding if it erodes the capacity of multilaterals 
effectively to monitor and disseminate information. The impartiality of the 
international agency pooling information is vital for monitoring. Countries need to 
trust an international agency in order to give it information and to respect the integrity 
of the information it, in turn, provides its members. 
The chronic underinvestment by donors in health systems relative to other 
priorities provides our second example here (46). Donors have been reticent to invest 
significantly in what is broadly known as health systems strengthening, either through 
traditional multilaterals, vertical funds or their own bilateral mechanisms, despite the 
broad-based recognition that health systems are vital to achieving durable vertical and 
horizontal prerogatives alike. This reticence is also there for the monies needed to 
invest in building core capacities to prevent, detect and respond to new infectious 
disease outbreaks (47). Not until 2012 did donor funds targeting health systems 
broadly surpass $2 billion per year, a level it stayed above in the subsequent two years 
(46). In 2014, the U.S. was the largest provider of development assistance for health 
in this arena at $425 million. These are not insignificant sums on an absolute basis 
though they are significantly lower than the almost $36 billion in development 
assistance for health disbursed in 2014 or the more than $14 billion through bilateral 
and multilateral channels such as the Global Fund given to fight HIV/AIDS, 
tuberculosis and malaria. The relative sense of priorities is clear although we 
acknowledge that some of the rationale for these trends is donor mind-set that 
countries should finance health systems through domestic sources. 
On the more positive side, the new health funding has filled historic 
underinvestment in other areas (such as HIV/AIDS throughout the 1980s and 1990s 
with the Global Fund) or regained recently lost ground (such as with vaccines in the 
1990s through Gavi). They have encouraged social mobilization and strong civil 
society participation at all levels from the Boardroom to the field. Further, new 
mechanisms have focused attention on how and where more traditional international 
organizations, such as the World Bank and WHO, might do better, while also 
maintaining pressure on the Global Fund and Gavi to live up to their founders’ 
expectations, including their nimbleness to reform when necessary. Additionally, it is 
conceivable that the greater control donors have over their funds and the heightened 
ability to monitor how those funds are used have led to more funds being contributed, 
funds that otherwise may not have flowed to global health at all.   
 
The Future of Global Health Governance 
 
We offer final reflections on the future of global health governance related to 
WHO based on our analysis of the three other institutions.  
First, WHO’s volatile financial state is a reflection of a lack of trust in the 
agency. WHO’s reform agenda proposes broadening the funding base by attracting 
donations from foundations, emerging economies, and the private sector. Although 
worthwhile, these stakeholders are unlikely to behave differently than traditional 
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donors, and will prefer to control their funds through earmarks, particularly if they are 
not offered a meaningful say in how their funds will be used. Reliance on 
philanthropic and corporate funding, moreover, opens the agency to the charge that it 
is not fully independent. The Global Fund’s experience demonstrates that hoping for 
and even investing in recruiting broad private sector and philanthropic support does 
not necessarily yield substantial financial support.  
Second, rather than simply asking for more money, the agency needs to work 
toward a ‘new deal’ with donors. In return for flexibility and predictability, the 
agency would scale back on activities agreed by the Executive Board so that it 
focuses on making gains where it has unique comparative advantage in global health 
today.  
Third, membership, including voting rights, and transparency, which both tie 
into monitoring and accountability, needs to be explicitly addressed. Because non-
state actors have not been given a voice within WHO, they have redirected their 
energies elsewhere. This process has ‘hollowed out’ WHO, as resources and influence 
move to partnerships such as the Global Fund and Gavi where non-state actors have 
more input. The World Bank recognized this problem and launched the Civil Society 
Forum, convened in advance of its Annual Spring Meetings every year.  
Transparency is also key. Stakeholders demand clarity on how their resources 
will achieve improved health outcomes. Yet, an independent evaluation graded WHO 
as ‘weak’ on key parameters, such as cost-consciousness, financial management, 
public disclosure, and achievement of development objectives (48). The 2011 reform 
agenda promised to establish independent evaluations of WHO’s work (49). This 
would then be in line with the independent evaluations the Global Fund has 
periodically both commissioned and participated in, as well as the increasing 
openness of both Gavi and even the World Bank, around the grants and loans each 
finances. For example, in 2010, the Bank introduced a formal access to information 
policy which detailed that information would be disclosed unless it is on the policy’s 
exceptions list (50, 51). Additionally, the Bank publishes extensively on the results of 
its programmatic investments, certain internal assessments, and through the Bank’s 
Independent Evaluation Group (IEG). WHO has not yet introduced regular 
independent evaluations nor a public information policy. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The past few decades have seen the consolidation of influence across all four 
of our case study institutions in the roles that the U.S., U.K., and the Gates 
Foundation have all played. This is clearly evident in the creation of Gavi and in the 
disproportional role each play from a financing perspective in Gavi, the Global Fund, 
and WHO. Additionally, the Gates Foundation has changed how institutions are held 
accountable, given that it is a philanthropic body substantively different from 
government representatives. The significant role the Gates Foundation plays in global 
health makes it imperative that all four major global health institutions engage with it. 
It continually puts pressure on performance and results, and when unhappy, pushes 
for quick reform in whatever ways that it can, including withdrawing or providing 
funds. The persistence of a small group of funders to the World Bank’s IDA raises the 
specter that the institution is also beholden to a small number of donors.  
How institutions maintain autonomy and discretion when relying entirely or 
predominately on voluntary donor commitments is a key question, particularly as we 
look to more diagonal interventions complementing developing country governments’ 
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own efforts rather than vertical interventions funded by donors alone. In addition, 
recent trends indicate that the monies available for global health will become more 
limited as limited growth has come to characterize development assistance for health 
(52). In this environment of limited funds and competing priorities, it is now more 
important than ever for attention to be paid to what institutions in global health donors 
are willing to pay for, for what reasons and with what consequences.  
 
 
 
 
Author Contributions: 
Both authors contributed equally to the design, data collection, analysis, interpretation 
and writing of the manuscript.  
 
Conflict of Interest Statement: 
Chelsea Clinton discloses that the Clinton Health Access Initiative (CHAI) has 
worked with the Global Fund as well as served on a few Country Coordinating 
Mechanisms for Global Fund grants and additionally has worked with the World 
Bank on health systems strengthening and rebuilding, among other areas, and also has 
had various interactions with WHO and Gavi. 
 
Devi Sridhar has nothing to disclose. 
 
(1) Nathan Blanchet, Milan Thomas, Rifat Atun, et al., ‘Global collective 
action in health: The WDR+20 landscape of core and supportive 
functions’ (report, 2013), accessed 29 August 2016, 
http://www.globalhealth2035.org/sites/default/files/working-
papers/global-collective-action-in-health.pdf.    
(2) World Health Organization, ‘Constitution of the World Health 
Organization’ (document, Geneva, Switzerland, October 2006), 
http://www.who.int/governance/eb/who_constitution_en.pdf.   
(3) World Health Organization, WHO membership as of 27 October 2015, 
http://www.who.int/countries/en/.   
(4) Fiona Godlee, ‘WHO in retreat: is it losing its influence?’ The BMJ 
(December 1994): p. 1491, accessed 27 October 2014, 
http://www.bmj.com/content/309/6967/1491. 
(5) World Health Organization, ‘Scale of assessments for 2014-2015: Foreign 
exchange risk management’ (report by the Secretariat, Sixty-Sixth World 
Health Assembly, 22 March 2013), 
http://apps.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf_files/WHA66/A66_32-en.pdf. 
(6) World Health Organization, ‘Essential medicines and health products’, 
accessed 28 October 2015, 
http://www.who.int/medicines/services/essmedicines_def/en/. 
(7) Halfdan Mahler, Director-General of the WHO, ‘World Health For All’ 
(speech, Fortieth World Health Assembly, 5 May 1987), as qtd. in Nitsan 
Chorev, The World Health Organization: Between North and South (New 
York: Cornell University Press, 2012), pp. 144-145. 
(8) Yves Beigbeder, Mahyar Nashat, Marie-Antoinette Orsini, and Jean-
Francois Tiercy, The World Health Organization (Boston: Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, 1998), p. 163. 
Accepted for publication in the Lancet. Not for Circulation or Distribution.  
	   12	  
(9) World Health Organization, ‘Status of collection of assessed contributions, 
including member states in arrears in the payment of their contributions to 
an extent that would justify invoking Article 7 of the Constitution’ (report 
by the Secretariat, 68th World Health Assembly, 10 April 2015), 
http://apps.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf_files/WHA68/A68_39-en.pdf.   
(10) World Health Organization, ‘Resolutions’ (report by the 59th World 
Health Assembly, 27 May 2006), accessed 29 August 2016,  
http://apps.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf_files/WHA59-REC1/e/Resolutions-
en.pdf.     
(11) Fiona Godlee, ‘The World Health Organisation: WHO in Crisis’, The 
BMJ, no. 309 (November 1994): p. 1424, accessed 27 October 2014, 
http://www.bmj.com/content/309/6966/1424.  
(12) Laurie Garrett, ‘Ebola’s Lessons: How the WHO Mishandled the Crisis’, 
Foreign Affairs, September/October 2015, accessed 20 August 2015, 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/west-africa/2015-08-18/ebolas-
lessons?campaign=Garrett. 
(13) World Health Organization, ‘Voluntary contributions’, accessed 2 
October 2015, http://www.who.int/about/finances-
accountability/funding/voluntary-contributions/en/.  
(14) Kamran Abbasi, ‘The World Bank and world health: Under fire’, The 
BMJ (April 1999): p. 1003-1006, accessed 29 August 2016, 
http://www.bmj.com/content/318/7189/1003.  
(15) Jim Yong Kim, President of the World Bank Group, ‘Poverty, Health and 
the Human Future’ (speech, World Health Assembly, 21 May 2013).  
(16) Cristian Baeza, Director, Health, Nutrition and Population, The World 
Bank, ‘The World Bank in Health 2012: Challenges, Priorities, and Role 
in the Global Health Aid Architecture’ (presentation, 31 January 2012), p. 
5.  
(17) IHME, ‘Financing Global Health 2014: Shifts in Funding as the MDG 
Era Closes’, p. 122. 
(18) Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, ‘Financial Innovation Will Buy 
Vaccine to Help Eradicate Polio Worldwide’, accessed 18 May 2016, 
http://www.gatesfoundation.org/Media-Center/Press-
Releases/2003/04/Help-Eradicate-Polio-Worldwide.   
(19) Sarah Tenney and Anne Salda, Historical Dictionary of the World Bank 
(Lanham: The Scarecrow Press, Inc., 2014), p. 149. 
(20) Piera Tortora and Suzanne Steensen, ‘Making earmarked funding more 
effective: current practices and a way forward’ (report, OECD, 2014), 
accessed 4 January 2016, https://www.oecd.org/dac/aid-
architecture/Multilateral%20Report%20N%201_2014.pdf. 
(21) Authors’ own calculations based on raw Global Fund contribution data 
2000-2014: The Global Fund, ‘Financials’, accessed 2 December 2014, 
http://www.theglobalfun.dorg/en/financials/.  
(22) Bernard Rivers, ‘Brown and Chirac Propose New Ideas to Finance the 
Global Fund’, Global Fund Observer Newsletter (February 2005). 
(23) Juan Manuel Suarez del Toro, then-President of the International 
Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (speech to United 
Nations General Assembly, 2003), accessed 8 July 2012, 
http://www.ifrc.org/en/news-and-media/press-releases/general/federation-
Accepted for publication in the Lancet. Not for Circulation or Distribution.  
	   13	  
president-calls-for-equitable-contributions-framework-to-sustain-global-
fund-for-hivaids/.  
(24) Brook Baker and Eva Ombaka, ‘The danger of in-kind drug donations to 
the Global Fund’ The Lancet (April 2009): p. 1218-1221, accessed 29 
August 2016, http://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-
6736(08)61487-7/abstract.  
(25) Chelsea Clinton, ‘The Global Fund: An Experiment in Global 
Governance’ (DPhil dissertation, University of Oxford, 2014), p. 318-319.  
(26) Garrett Wallace Brown, ‘Safeguarding deliberative global governance: 
the case of The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria’, 
Review of International Studies, no. 36 (2010): pp. 522-523. 
(27) IHME, ‘Financing Global Health 2013: Transition in an Age of 
Austerity’, p. 21. 
(28) Authors’ own calculations based on: Gavi, The Vaccine Alliance, 
‘Annual donor contributions to Gavi, 2000-2033, as of 31 March 2014’, 
accessed 12 September 2014, http://www.gavi.org/funding/donor-
contributions-pledges/. 
(29) Author’s own calculations based on: Gavi, The Vaccine Alliance, ‘GAVI 
Alliance Annual Financial Report 2013’ (report, Geneva, Switzerland, 
September 2014), pp. 12-13. 
(30) Gavi, The Vaccine Alliance, ‘GAVI Alliance Annual Financial Report 
2013’ (report, Geneva, Switzerland, September 2014). 
(31) Gavi, The Vaccine Alliance, ‘Funding and finance’, accessed 7 July 
2012, http://www.gavialliance.org/funding/.  
(32) Gavi, The Vaccine Alliance, ‘Cash received by GAVI 2000-2010’, 31 
December 2010, accessed 3 May 2013, 
http://www.gavialliance.org/funding/donor-contributions-pledges/. 
(33) Gavi, The Vaccine Alliance, ‘Advance Market Commitment for 
Pneumococcal Vaccines’ (annual report, Geneva, Switzerland, 12 June 
2009 – 31 March 2010).  
(34) Gavi, The Vaccine Alliance, ‘Advance Market Commitment for 
Pneumococcal Vaccines’ (annual report, Geneva, Switzerland, April 2010 
– 31 March 2011). 
(35) Gavi, The Vaccine Alliance, ‘Advance Market Commitment for 
Pneumococcal Vaccines’ (annual report, Geneva, Switzerland, April 2011 
– 31 March 2012). 
(36) Gavi, The Vaccine Alliance, ‘Advance Market Commitment for 
Pneumococcal Vaccines’ (annual report, Geneva, Switzerland, April 2012 
– 31 March 2013).  
(37) Gavi, The Vaccine Alliance, ‘Advance Market Commitment for 
Pneumococcal Vaccines’ (annual report, Geneva, Switzerland, April 2013 
– 31 March 2014). 
(38) Gavi, The Vaccine Alliance, ‘Advance Market Commitment for 
Pneumococcal Vaccines’ (annual report, Geneva, Switzerland, April 2014 
– 31 March 2015). 
(39) HIV Vaccines and Microbicides Resource Tracking Working Group, 
‘Investing to End the AIDS Epidemic: A New Era for HIV Prevention 
Research & Development’ (report, July 2012). 
(40) Devi Sridhar and Ngaire Woods, ‘Trojan Multilateralism: Global 
Cooperation in Health’, Global Policy, no. 4 (October 2013): pp. 325-335. 
Accepted for publication in the Lancet. Not for Circulation or Distribution.  
	   14	  
(41) Daniel Nelson and Michael Tierney, ‘Delegation to International 
Organizations: Agency Theory and World Bank Environmental Reform’, 
International Organization, no. 57 (Spring 2003): p. 243.  
(42) Theresa Bridgeman, ‘Accountable to Whom? The World Bank and Its 
Inspection Panel 1994-2004’ (DPhil thesis, University of Oxford, 2011). 
(43) Moon, Suerie et al., ‘Will Ebola change the game? Ten essential reforms 
before the next pandemic. The report of the Harvard-LSHTM Independent 
Panel on the Global Response to Ebola’, The Lancet, no. 10009 (2015): p. 
2204-2221, accessed 18 May 2016, 
http://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-
6736(15)00946-0/abstract.  
(44) Charles Allen, ‘World Health and World Politics’, International 
Organization, no. 4 (February 1950): pp. 27-43. 
(45) Fink, Sheri, 'Cuts at W.H.O. Hurt Response to Ebola Crisis', The New 
York Times (03 September 2014).  
(46) IHME, ‘Financing Global Health 2015: Development assistance steady 
on the path to new Global Goals.’  
(47) GHRF Commission (Commission on a Global Health Risk Framework 
for the Future), ‘The neglected dimension of global security: A framework 
to counter infectious disease crises’ (report, 2016), accessed 29 August 
2016, https://nam.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Neglected-Dimension-
of-Global-Security.pdf.  
(48) United Kingdom Department for International Development, 
‘Multilateral Aid Review: Ensuring maximum value for money for U.K. 
aid through multilateral organisations’ (document, London, United 
Kingdom, March 2011), accessed 12 January 2016, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/
file/67583/multilateral_aid_review.pdf. 
(49) World Health Organization, ‘Independent Formative Evaluation of the 
World Health Organization’ (concept paper, Geneva, Switzerland, 22 June 
2011), accessed 12 January 2016, 
http://www.who.int/dg/reform/en_who_reform_evaluation.pdf. 
(50) The World Bank, ‘Overview’, accessed 5 May 2015, 
http://www.worldbank.org/en/access-to-information/overview. 
(51) The World Bank, ‘Policy on Access to Information’ (brochure, 
Washington, DC, 2015), accessed 2 December 2015, 
http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/pubdocs/publicdoc/2015/7/74062143741626
8169/AI-Brochure-2015.pdf. 
(52) Joseph Dieleman, Matthew Schneider, Annie Haakenstad, et al., 
‘Development assistance for health: past trends, associations, and the 
future of international financial flows for health’ The Lancet (April 2016): 
p. 2536-2544, accessed 29 August 2016, 
http://thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(16)30168-
4/fulltext). 
 
 
 
Box 1: The Response to HIV/AIDS 
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The case of multilateral cooperation on HIV/AIDS illustrates the dynamic 
process of donors’ realigning objectives. In the early 1980s, after overcoming 
significant initial reticence to address HIV/AIDS at all, donor governments were 
reluctant to invest heavily in WHO’s core budget: instead they attempted to ring-
fence their contribution. In 1986, the US government gave $2 million to WHO, 
conditioned on half the money spent on global AIDS control and half to fight 
HIV/AIDS in Africa. In 1987, donors supported the Global AIDS Programme 
launched by Jonathan Mann within WHO, but with a governance structure somewhat 
separate from WHO. Unlike other programs, it did not require approval from WHO 
regional offices for policy guidelines it promoted within their respective jurisdictions 
and its funding was extrabudgetary. Despite this tight grip on funds, donors became 
rapidly convinced that they were unable to control where additional AIDS money was 
being spent. In response to this frustration, WHO created several ways to channel 
bilateral aid through a new medium-term plan, so that donor governments could give 
money for the multilateral AIDS program while earmarking for country-specific 
projects. Yet, in 1990, the US Congress began to question publicly where the extra 
funds it had given over the last few years to WHO for AIDS had been used, amidst 
fear that the extra money had led to corruption, not progress in combating the disease.  
In 1992, donors conducted an external review of the WHO response to 
HIV/AIDS, which called for a new effort that could address HIV/AIDS as a 
development issue. The external review concluded that ‘no single agency is capable 
of responding to the totality of the problems posed by AIDS; and as never before, a 
cooperative effort, which is broadly based but guided by a shared sense of purpose, is 
essential (1).’ In 1994, G7 donors and U.S. and European HIV/AIDS activists alike 
agreed that a joint and cosponsored initiative would be established. The initiative 
would not be an agency in itself but instead leverage the resources of its co-
sponsoring UN agencies. The result was the Joint UN Programme on HIV/AIDS 
(UNAIDS) – a new body launched in 1996 – whose creation was the product of 
weaknesses within WHO, inter-agency conflict, and donor pressures for more control 
over a multisectoral approach (2). The momentum for the new agency was led by a 
group of donor countries, driven by AIDS activists from Europe and North America, 
and complemented with a desire for accountability of aid for HIV/AIDS, as fashioned 
by the UN’s Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). In 2015, the UNAIDS 
Program Coordinating Board includes 22 member states, 11 cosponsoring entities 
(including WHO and the World Bank), and four regional NGOs working on the 
epidemic or representing people living with HIV/AIDS (3). Despite the still broad-
based engagement, soon after its creation, UNAIDS donors began to view it as being 
unable to mobilize and spend large amounts of funding to fight the explosion of AIDS 
in Africa, in part because of its legal status as a UN entity (4). In other words, donors 
still remained reluctant to trust the UN system with the substantial funds that were 
increasingly recognized as being needed to combat the HIV/AIDS epidemic. 
As HIV/AIDS shifted to the top of the global agenda, the World Bank 
increased its HIV/AIDS efforts. In December 2000, the World Bank launched its 
Multi AIDS Program for Africa, better known as its MAP Program, which committed 
more Bank resources to AIDS in Africa in 2001 – $2 billion over 15 years – than all 
previous years combined. Yet, donors continued to worry that the Bank’s efforts 
would result in slow, inflexible, and top-down programs that would take too long to 
respond to countries’ needs. There were also worries that the Bank’s procurement 
rules would hinder developing country-ownership of their own HIV/AIDS agenda (5). 
Additionally, donors such as the U.S. and United Kingdom (U.K.), supported by the 
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G7 in Okinawa, felt that the World Bank supported top-down public sector spending, 
at the cost of supporting more effective NGOs, community groups, or local or 
international private sector providers. While the Bank may have hoped its financial 
commitment to the MAP Program would gain donors’ trust, it quickly became clear 
those hopes were not to materialize in substantial donor commitments. Throughout 
2000-2001, it was evident that UN Secretary General Kofi Annan clearly believed a 
new entity was needed to signal a new level of commitment by the world to combat 
HIV/AIDS, TB, and malaria (6). Pressures mounted for another new agency, and the 
Global Fund took shape.  
 It is difficult to imagine a stronger donor endorsement for the Global Fund 
than the U.S. government’s persistent levels of high funding, in most years accounting 
for one-third of the Fund’s budget. Most of the U.S. contributions come from the 
President’s Emergency Plan For AIDS Relief program, or PEPFAR. Created in 2003 
by President George W. Bush, with a strong budget from Congress, and reauthorized 
every five years since, PEPFAR is now the largest source of funds to combat 
HIV/AIDS, both bilaterally and through the Global Fund. By 2003, early results from 
Global Fund grants hinted that more money could make a real difference (even while 
acknowledging growing pains for the Fund and grantees alike) (7). One could argue 
that at least in the Global Fund’s early years, its greatest achievement was in being a 
catalyst for PEPFAR. Or, one could argue that PEPFAR catalyzed more giving by 
other donors to the Global Fund. It also could be argued that PEPFAR enabled the 
U.S. greater leverage over the Global Fund given its financial importance to the Fund. 
What is inarguably clear is that the Fund’s story is inextricably linked to that of its 
largest donor, the U.S. What is also true is that PEPFAR influenced, and even 
constrained, the role of the World Bank’s MAP in countries and may have further 
stymied any HIV/AIDS efforts with WHO (8). Despite the persistent search for new 
beginnings in the fight against HIV/AIDS, the fates of newer and older efforts alike 
continue to be intertwined.  
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